Summary. This paper is concerned with n-person games which t ypically occur in mathematical con ict models cf. 4 , 7 , 8 . These games are so called cost-games, in which e v ery actor tries to minimize his own costs and the costs are interlinked by a system of linear inequalities. It is shown that, if the players cooperate, i.e., minimize the sum of all the costs, they achieve a Nash Equilibrium. In order to determine Nash Equilibria, the simplex method can be applied with respect to the dual problem. An important special case is discussed and numerical examples are presented.
Introduction
The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new economic instruments which h a ve a focus on environmental protection in the macro and micro economy. An important economic tool being part of the treaty o f K y oto in that area is Joint-Implementation. I t i s a n i n ternational program being part of the treaty o f K y oto which i n tends to strenghten international cooperations between enterprises in order to reduce CO 2 -reductions. A sustainable development can only be guaranteed if the instrument i s e mbedded in an optimal energy management. Optimal energy management according to Joint-Implementation means in this context that it must work on a micro level with minimal costs and it should be protected against misuse on a macro level. For that reason, the TEM model Technology-Emissions-Means model was developed, giving the possibility to simulate such an extraordinary market situation.
The TEM model Technology-Emissions-Means model
The realization of Joint-Implementation JI is determined by technical and nancial constraints. In a JI Program the reduced emissions resulting from technical cooperations are registrated at the Clearing House. The TEM model integrates both the simulation of the technical and nancial parameters. For that reason we w ant t o g i v e a short introduction into the TEM model at the beginning. In Pickl 1999 the TEM model is treated as a time-discrete control problem. Furthermore, the analysis of the feasible set is examined in Pickl 2000. In the following, after having introduced the TEM model we want to present a new GAME
The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors players which i n tend to maximize their emissions reduced E i caused by technologies T i b y means of expenditures of money M i or nancial means, respectively. The index stands for the i-th player, i 2 f 1; : : : ; n g.
The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TechnologyEmission-Means model, in short: TEM model.
em ij tM j t 1 Furthermore, we are able to determine the em ij -parameter empirically. In the rst equation the level of the reduced emissions at the t-th timestep depends upon the last value plus a market e ect. This e ect expresses itself in the additive terms which might be negative or positive. In general, E i 0 implies that the actors have reached yet the demanded value E i = 0 normalized Kyoto-level. A value E i 0 expresses that the emissions are less than the requirements of the treaty. In the second equation we see that for such a situation the nancial means will increase whereas E i 0 leads to a reduction of M i t + 1:
The second equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the memory parameter ' i which describes the e ect of the preceeding investment of nancial means. The dynamics does not guarantee, that the parameter M i t lies in the interval, which can be regarded as a budget for the i-th actor.
For that reason we h a ve to add restrictions to the dynamical representation. We can use the TEM model as a time-discrete model where we start with a special parameter set and observe the resulting trajectories. Normally, the actors start with a negative v alue, i.e., they lie under the baseline mentioned in Kyoto Protocol, see Kyoto 1997. They try to reach a positive v alue of E i . I f w e add control parameters, we enforce this development b y an additive nancial term. For that reason the control parameter are added only to the second equation.
i , M i t fE i t + ' i E i tg + u i t u i t control parameter In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state which is mentioned in the treaty o f Kyoto by c hoosing the control parameters such that the emissions of each player become minimized. The focal point is the realization of the necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost game, which is determined by the way of cooperation of the actors.
The Cost-Game in the TEM Model
If we regard the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the TEM-model The method is that at each time step, the amount of our cost-game is put into a central fund, which can also be used as feasible set for our control process. In the following we w ant to analyse a special allocation principle.
This minimization problem leads directly to the following allocation problem which w e will solve in the next section. Using linear programming techniques and the simplex method Nash Equilibria are determined. Together with the basic theory 5 then we are able to simulate and analyse an economical Joint-Implementation Program 7 with the TEM model in the sense of Gustav F eichtinger 2 , 3 .
The Allocation Problem
In connection with the TEM-Model 7 which is based on a general con ict model 6 the following allocation problem is in the center of interest. In order to develop a Joint-Implementation Program we begin with the following formulation:
Given n players who pursue n goals which are given by a n n-vector b = b 1 ; : : : ; b n T with b i 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n :
In order to achieve these goals every player has to put in a certain amount 
5
In the sequel we assume that there is a vector x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n with x i 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; nfor which the inequalities 2 are satis ed. Then, for every i, the i-th player, of course, is interested in minimizing his own contribution x i . In general, this will not be possible simultaneously. S o the players will have to cooperate. Let us assume that they choosex 2 IR n with 2 and x j 0; j = 1 ; : : : ; n ;for a x = x such that which implies thatx is a Nash equilibrium.
On the Determination of Nash-Equilibria
The problem of minimizing 3 subject to 2 and 12 If we put y i = 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n , then we obtain a solution of 11 and 12. Under the above assumption that there exists a solution of 5 and 7 we can apply a well known duality theorem and conclude that there exists a solution x 2 IR n of 5 and 9 which minimizes 6 and a solutionŷ 2 IR n of 11 and 12 which maximizes 10 and that sx = tŷ which is equivalent t ô This means that, if all players oppose each other but every player's contribution to achieving his own goal is larger than the negative sum of his opponents, then everybody can reach an absolutely minimal amount of money. If they replace C by a matrix C with C C such that there exists x 2 IR n with 9 and 2, then x x, i.e., every player gets a better result x which is a Nash equilibrium.
The General Case
We assume that there is a solution of 4 and 5 which implies that the dual problem has a solution. 
